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Abstract 
Apart from being a cost, prices inform consumers on the quality of goods. To retain 
informative power, discounted prices are often presented together with their original value as an 
External Reference Price (ERP). Observing the impact of the ERP on consumer preferences using 
two contingent valuation surveys to wine consumers, the paper observes that the presence of both 
prices and ERPs guide consumer choices. In particular, ERPs shift the attention of consumers 
towards expensive products and high discounts, by providing information on quality and allowing 
for time-efficient decisions. Results show that ERPs: a) have a positive impact on preferences, but 
less (in absolute value) than prices; b) stimulate the choice of items with high price and large 
discounts; c) make consumers revise their choices. The presence of an ERP can, in certain 
conditions, lead to a positive response to high prices.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In modern markets consumers are often called to choose in conditions of risk and uncertainty 
about the intrinsic quality of goods they buy (Ariely and Norton, 2011; Akerlof, 1970). However, 
buyers can use prices to determine the quality of goods and to rank different options by quality 
before a choice (Monroe, 1973; Rao and Monroe, 1989; Kirmani and Rao, 2000; Rao, 2005; 
Gerstner, 1985), assuming a positive price-quality correlation (Ding et al., 2010). This price-quality 
heuristic is based on the common knowledge that high quality requires expensive inputs and can be 
produced in limited quantity (Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). Furthermore, suppliers of high quality 
goods use high prices to signal their superior quality (Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1987; Spence, 2002) 
and can count on future profits only if the high price-high quality relation truly exists (Cooper and 
Ross, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991).  
While research has explored extensively this price-quality proxy, there is little understanding 
of the cognitive distortion discounts may cause to the assumption of a positive price-quality 
correlation (Palazon and Delgado-Ballester, 2009). For example, in the occurrence of a temporary 
price change, a product worth £ 15 and sold at £ 10 would be perceived to perform less well at the 
discounted price compared to its full price if the latter is unknown. Any imperfect expectation 
should correct itself through repeated consumption, but quality distortions caused by price 
perception are not fully conscious (Plassman et al., 2008; Shiv et al., 2005a): they alter the 
experience performance of goods, limiting an effective learning process.  
A common strategy to overcome this problem is to provide quality cues. Retailers often 
provide consumers with External Reference Prices (ERP) (Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995; 
Mazumdar et al., 2005). This piece of information refers to: the price of a direct substitute, referred 
to as a contextual reference price (Rajendran and Tellis, 1994), i.e. the price of a competing brand; 
or an advertised reference price, i.e. the price of the same good in a different location (e.g. a 
competing store), in a previous shopping trip (a temporal reference price), or from a different source 
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(e.g. the recommended retail price) (Mazumdar et al., 2005). ERPs are called external because they 
are not generated within the consumer’s mind and represent pieces of information external to the 
bundle of attributes that are needed in a transaction (Zeithaml, 1988; Mayhew and Winer, 1992; and 
Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003). 
The primary objective of this article is to understand consumer behaviour in the presence of 
an ERP. The literature on the subject is well established (e.g. Mayhew and Winer, 1992; and 
Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003), but the mechanisms underlying their use are not yet fully 
understood. Current research indicates that consumers’ response to prices contains a significant 
behavioural component driven by a subjective cognitive interpretation of ERPs, as well as feelings 
and emotions ERPs may evoke (Thomas, 2013; Cheng and Monroe, 2013). Importantly, ERPs 
might induce an automatic consumer response, i.e. a positive prime, which makes choices faster by 
reducing cognitive effort. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether ERPs direct and change 
consumer choices. To explore this matter, this article estimates a utility function for wine, a good 
with high search costs, to understand whether choices with knowledge of an ERP differ from those 
without it. Using the same dataset, Panzone (2012) observes that exogenous changes in ERP alter 
the perceived quality of goods, but does not compare choices with and without ERPs. 
Specifically, ERPs could cause an anchoring bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Ariely et 
al., 2003), whereby consumers base their quality expectations on ERPs possibly perceiving them as 
more reliable than their own inference (see also Kopalle et al., 2012). Similarly, ERPs could cause 
an attentional bias (Smith et al., 2006): by signalling quality, they may make other pieces of 
information less relevant to the choice task. Adaptation theory indicates that expectations over 
future outcomes depend on past experienced outcomes and current stimuli (Chen, 2009), and 
because past hedonic performances unconsciously depend on ERPs (Plassmann et al., 2008; Shiv et 
al., 2005a) their presence is likely to reinforce a bias and make it automatic. The result of this 
inferential process may lead consumers to prefer an item when both expensive (i.e. high ERP) and 
with a high discount (i.e. low price to pay), giving little attention to other product characteristics.  
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Choices rely heavily on non-sensory information (Peri, 2006; Jaeger, 2006) such as contextual 
cues and marketing activities (Dawson, 2013; Dhar and Novemsky, 2008), which are crucial in 
some wine segments (Lockshin et al., 2006). ERPs anchor a consumer’s valuation to the extent that 
any price information is assessed with respect to its original price. Economic theories of consumer 
behaviour allow for an impact of ERPs on choices, but their presence would not be anticipated to 
affect price sensitivity, because price alone determines the allocation of money. Note that the ERP 
should be expected to restore the distortion of the price-quality proxy in the presence of discounts 
with an overall neutral effect, and a high impact of ERPs on utility would entail consumers can be 
“nudged” into purchasing a good just by including an ERP.  
A second objective is to understand how ERPs are used. Consumers use price to infer 
unobservable product quality (e.g. Monroe, 1973; Kirmani and Rao, 2000; Rao, 2005). However, 
prices may become (partially or fully) uninformative when an ERP is present, because quality is 
now communicated by another source. Furthermore, consumers gain positive feelings from the 
knowledge of a discount, and the ERPs make this monetary reward salient (Mayhew and Winer, 
1992; Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003). Knowledge of the discount then reduces the 
importance of the cost component of price, reducing price sensitivity. A final objective is to observe 
whether the presence of ERPs changes consumer choices. By comparing consumers’ responses in 
the two CV surveys, it is possible to examine whether the same respondent revises her choice when 
the ERP is known. Data indicate 36% of consumers changed their initial decision, and inconsistency 
is a frequent outcome. Consumers revised their utility downwards more frequently than upwards, 
depending on the position of price relative to the ERP.  
These research questions are explored through two contingent valuation (CV) surveys to wine 
consumers. Albeit rarely used for market goods (e.g. Park and MacLachlan, 2008), this technique is 
recognised as reliable in the determination of consumer preferences (Hanemann, 1994; Wong, 
1997; Carson et al., 2001; Alberini et al., 2003). The use of stated preferences allows estimating a 
utility function for wine removing the collinearity between price and ERP, and the possible 
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endogeneity of discounts. In the first CV survey, respondents indicated their intention to purchase 
an existing wine at a given randomly allocated price. In the second survey, respondents repeated the 
task in the presence of an advertised ERP. Because CV responses are not fully incentive-compatible 
(Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002), results are compared to estimates from revealed preference.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the econometric model used in 
the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the data collection process. The case study focuses on the 
wine market because of its highly differentiated supply, and common use of price as quality proxy 
(Mitchell and Greatorex, 1989; Chaney, 2000; Drummond and Rule, 2005; Ritchie, 2007). 
Furthermore, wine choices appear to be made in condition of risk and uncertainty over intrinsic 
quality (Mitchell and Greatorex, 1989; Drummond and Rule, 2005), making the context suitable for 
the purposes of this study. Results are presented in section 4, while section 5 discusses the findings 
of the article and concludes.  
2. ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
The present section incorporates the ERP into a simple economic model of choice. In the 
market, a consumer j with income Yj is expected to purchase a wine i with characteristics Xi sold at 
a market price Pi only if he expects a positive utility from the intrinsic quality of the good, Si. The 
utility of the consumer corresponds to 
)( iij SUU          (1) 
Si is unknown to consumers, and choices are risky and lead to uncertain outcomes, particularly in 
information intensive markets. Consumers will then infer Si on the basis of information available. 
2.1. Only price available 
In the absence of an objective measure of Si, consumers estimate quality on the basis of 
observable characteristics (Broniarczyk and Alba, 1994) and price (Rao, 2005), through a subjective 
process (Alba and Hutchinson, 2000). The estimated Sij can be specified as  
6 
 
),,(ˆ jiiij DPXgS            (2a) 
where Dj are demographics. The resulting utility function can then be written as 
ijjijioij YPDXU   4321      (3a) 
where ηij are normally distributed residuals. The coefficient of price ( 3 ) in equation (3a) refers to 
the utility of price as a cost, C , and as information about product quality, I , so that 
)(3 CI   . A negative 3  indicates that the absolute value of the cost element is larger than 
the informational one. Conversely, the price coefficient is positive whenever price as information is 
more important than price as a cost (Veblen, 1899; Leibenstein, 1950; Basmann et al., 1988). 
Finally, the equality IC    implies 03  , a condition that can be misinterpreted with price 
non-attendance (Scarpa et al., 2009). 
2.2. Price and ERP available  
Imagine now consumer j is presented with an ERP. This information indicates the actual 
valuation of the product before the discount, and can be used in the inferential process (Urbany et 
al., 1988; Mayhew and Winer, 1992). The quality-inference function becomes 
),,,(ˆ ijiiij ERPDPXgS          (2b) 
which leads to the utility function  
ijjiijioij YERPPDXU   54321    (3b) 
Expectedly, the inclusion of a further attribute impacts choices (Islam et al., 2007) because it 
reshapes the perception about the relative price and quality of the product (a content aspect). The 
ERP might also change the difficulty of making a decision (a process aspect), a feature the proposed 
models captures only under the assumption that the former is mediated by the latter, i.e. the change 
in difficulty is only caused by the different inferential process when ERPs are provided1.  
                                                 
1 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point.  
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The literature provides no understanding of whether market price and ERP substitute or 
complement each other in the provision of quality information. In other words, it is unclear whether 
consumers stop using market price as a quality cue when an ERP is available. Consequently, the 
price coefficient 3  might retain both cost and some quality information, so that )(3
P
IC   ; 
while the coefficient of the ERP, ERPI 4 , contains information on quality measured as the 
monetary size of the savings (Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003). The 
ERP is expected to contribute positively towards utility ( 04  ). 
2.3. The utility of price in the presence of discounts 
To observe the influence of discounts on utility, the paper exploits the relation between price 
and ERP. In particular, retailers choose price as iii ERPP  )1(  , where π is the rate of discount. 
Substituting this relation into equation (3b) leads to 
  ijjiijioij YERPDXU   54321 )1(   (4) 
In the absence of a discount (π = 0), equation (4) converges to equation (1). If consumers do not use 
ERPs ( 04  ) and prices convey no information ( 0
P
I ), the estimated price coefficient only 
reflects a response to changes in cost to the consumer (i.e. a pure Hicksian price effect). In equation 
(4), a discount changes the sensitivity to the full price of a product: because 0)1(  i , an 
increase in π reduces the disutility of the cost component of price ( 03  ), but not that of the ERP 
( 04  ). The effect of price on choice is positive for sufficiently high discounts, precisely 
whenever 43 )]1([   .  
2.4. Estimation of the utility function 
To estimate equations (3a) and (3b) empirically, utility is treated as a latent construct 
*
ijU , 
whose relation with ijU  is defined as  
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        (5) 
The approach in equation (5) is typical of any binary choice model, for both revealed and stated 
preferences (e.g. Lockshin et al., 2006). An estimation of the relation between ERP and price within 
the same utility function using revealed preferences is affected by multicollinearity problems: the 
discounted price is a function of the original price of the product; and price is collinear with product 
characteristics. At the same time, retailers decide price promotions based on the expected response 
of consumer segments (Kopalle et al., 1999), making discounts endogenous.  
Consequently, a stated preference approach is more appropriate for the objective of this 
research, and the empirical analysis uses a Double Bounded Dichotomous Choice (DBDC) CV 
survey that randomly allocates bid values independent on ERP and wine characteristics. The same 
utility function could have been estimated using a choice experiment (e.g. Mueller et al., 2010; 
Lockshin et al., 2006), allowing respondents to compare different alternative products in the market 
and allowing for more realistic substitution patterns. However, a CV methodology was preferred for 
its flexible implementation and the simplicity of the task in the absence of an interviewer. 
Moreover, the objective was to allow consumers valuing items in isolation to avoid a “Distinction 
bias” (Hsee and Zhang, 2004), whereby the presence of other products leads to a biased perception 
of differences between them. In a complex context as the wine market, the bias would overestimate 
the role of the ERP (i.e. large response to ERP when products are similar). Results indicate that 
estimates for price and ERP from revealed preferences are comparable to those of the CV.  
The econometric approach used merges two branches of CV research: it integrates the 
simultaneous estimation of the two rounds of bidding (Cameron and Quiggin, 1994) with a utility 
scale incorporating uncertainty (Wang, 1997). Specifically, the CV uses a 5-point utility scale 
(Welsh and Poe, 1998; Alberini et al., 2003) with uncertainty points, “Unsure” and “Probably” 
options (Wang, 1997; Welsh and Poe, 1998; Alberini et al., 2003), which allow consumers to locate 
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their preferences more accurately and reduce the hypothetical bias. The relation between *ijU  and 
ijU  becomes  
0
*
ijij
1
*
ij0ij
2
*
ij1ij
3
*
ij2ij
*
ij3ij
μUifNo0U
μUμifNoProbably1U
μUμifUnsure2U
μUμifYesProbably3U
UμifYes4U





      (6) 
where μ indicates the average cut-off points of the utility scale. 
DBDC CV surveys ask consumers to state their preferences in two subsequent rounds, 
differing only in the value of the random bid P. Each round gives indications on the underlying 
utility function of consumers, and can be analysed by a two-equation system of simultaneous 
regressions 
ijjijioij
ijjijioij
YPDXU
YPDXU
24,223,22,21,2,2
*
2
14,113,12,11,1,1
*
1




     (7a) 
and 
ijjiijioij
ijjiijioij
YERPPDXU
YERPPDXU
25,24,223,22,21,2,2
*
2
15,14,113,12,11,11
*
1




   (7b) 
Residuals of both equations are assumed normally distributed and correlated, with  a polychoric 
correlation coefficient ρ (Greene and Hensher, 2009, page 225). Parameters are estimated using a 
bivariate ordered probit regression.   
To further limit the occurrence of a hypothetical bias in this CV exercise, the survey uses a 
cheap-talk script (Lusk, 2003; Cummings and Taylor, 1999). This step entails the presentation of a 
text containing clear instructions on the economic implications of the answers to respondents (Lusk, 
2003). These two steps have demonstrated effectiveness in moderating the hypothetical bias to a 
great extent. The questionnaire also followed peer-reviewed guidelines to minimise the potential 
impact of biases in CV surveys (i.e. Venkatachalam, 2004; Carson, 2000; Carson et al., 2001). To 
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assess the robustness of the results, estimated coefficients from stated preferences are compared 
with revealed preferences from a nested logit regression in the same study area from Panzone 
(2012). Because of the nature of the models, revealed preferences estimate segment choice 
parameters, while the CV task estimates brand choice parameters.  
3. THE SURVEY  
Preferences for wine have been collected though a DBDC CV survey in the Greater Reading 
postcode area (Berkshire, United Kingdom). Respondent were adults resident in the area and 
randomly selected from the edited version of the electoral register2. Interviewees were presented 
with an existing wine sold in the area (750 ml bottle), and asked whether they would be willing to 
purchase it at a randomly allocated price. The sample of wines was identified through an in-store 
survey in off-licence retailers in the study area (see table 1). The survey registered the purchase of 
260 wines purchased by 160 consumers. Information collected included product characteristics (on 
the label), original and discounted price of the product (verified in store and on the receipt), and the 
characteristics of the consumer (details can be found in Panzone, 2012). The objective of this first 
survey was to obtain a representative sample of both wines and respondents, and any product was 
included as many times as it appeared (only 5 items were repeated twice). Participants received no 
incentive for participation in any of the surveys. 
Each wine in the sample was randomly allocated to a different resident, with no specific 
information on the purpose of the study. Respondents were presented with a replica label containing 
all the information on the real bottle of the wine (figure 1), and asked whether they would be 
willing to buy it at a price; respondents were then asked their purchase intention at a second bid, 
higher in case of positive response or lower to negative responses. Bid values were prepared in four 
different formats following Rowe et al. (1996) (table 2) and planned to fit the range of selling prices 
obtained from a pilot survey (32 wines, range £ 2.68-£ 8.99). Bids have been approximated to their 
                                                 
2 http://www.ico.org.uk/for_the_public/topic_specific_guides/electoral_register 
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closest 9 ending (Schindler and Kibarian, 1996; Schindler and Kirby, 1997), consistent with 
revealed preference data (66.0% of the prices and 74.7% of ERPs ending in 9). 
After this first step, respondents repeated the choice task with a “was-now” advertised ERP 
(Rajendran and Tellis, 1994). Here, a sentence read “TWO MONTHS AGO, this wine was actually 
sold in [Name of the retailer where the wine was surveyed] at a price of £ [Full price of the wine at 
the time of the in-store survey]”. Bid values for the two rounds were identical to those in the first 
step, and the choice probability task was identical (a within-subject treatment). No information was 
provided regarding the price change, and the difference between the ERP and the bid could be 
perceived as either a discount or an exogenous price change. Precisely, the ERP was larger for 123 
respondents, lower for 64 respondents, and identical for 7, an unusual feature for the marketplace 
that retains the idea of a quality proxy. 
To maximise the response rate, the 260 questionnaires (each containing one of the wines 
collected in the mall survey) were sent out in four versions to four potential respondents, each 
containing one of the four scales in table 2. Only the first response to arrive was included in the 
final analysis. Of the 1,040 questionnaires sent (260 wines x 4 versions, 226 of which returned valid 
and complete), the final sample covered 194 of the 260 initial wines. The respondents of the 32 
excluded questionnaires did not differ significantly on most demographics, although respondents in 
the final sample tend to: spend more on wine; buy more wine; belong to households with more wine 
drinkers; be men (10% significance level); more frequently be 18-25 years old (10%) and less 
frequently be 46-55 years old; have graduate education; and less frequently report an income 
<£15,000 whilst more frequently indicating income band >£55,0003.  
4. RESULTS  
Before proceeding to the results, it worth observing whether the price behaviour of the data 
collected is comparable with observed market data (figure 2 and table 3). An initial analysis 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to an anonymous referee to suggest the inclusion of this information. 
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suggests that the sample of wine proposed in the CV survey fits within the price range used by 
respondents. The average self-reported usual price paid for a wine is £5.41 (range: £3.00-£15.00), 
very close to the average of the second bid presented (£5.44). At the same time, wines in the sample 
are more expensive than usually paid if considered before discount (£6.79) but cheaper at their 
market price (£5.17). As a comparison, data from Tesco indicate that the average price paid in their 
local stores during the survey (April-May 2009) was in the range £4.30-£4.11 in supermarkets and 
£4.46-£4.44 in convenience stores (figure 3), with full prices between £4.5 and £5. Consequently, 
wines included in the sample fit the price segment of interest to respondents. At the same time, 
consumers in the mall intercept did not differ significantly from those of the CV survey, the only 
difference being the presence of non-resident population (e.g. students) in the mall intercept.  
The impact of price and ERP on consumers’ utility has been estimated in accordance with the 
specifications of equations (3a) and (3b). Product characteristics included in the regression are 
colour, AOC, alcohol content, retailer’s label, and age of the wine4. Characteristics of the 
respondent include the logarithm of income and age5, the number of wine drinkers in the household, 
and self-reported wine expertise (on a 5-point scale). Variables are summarised in table 4. The 
dependent variable is the answer to each bid of the CV exercise.  
4.1. Did consumers use the ERP in stating their preferences? 
Estimated coefficients of equations (3a) and (3b) are presented in table 5. Models A, C, and E 
estimate utility when ERPs are unavailable, while models B, D, and F when ERPs are known. The 
last column in table 5 refers to revealed preferences. Models differ on the covariates included: 
product characteristics correlate with the ERP, and utility could be endogenous in wine expertise. 
As a result, models A and B only include price variables and demographics; models C and D add 
product characteristics; while model E and F include wine knowledge. Revealed preferences only 
                                                 
4 Age for wines reporting no vintage year was replaced by the mean value of the sample and identified through a 
dummy variable. 
5 Income (in 1,000 pounds) and age were included as the median of the income band selected by the respondent. 
Missing income information was replaced by the mean value and identified through a dummy variable. 
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include product characteristics to ensure convergence given the relatively low number of 
observations. Importantly, the coefficients of price are considerably close across specifications, an 
indication of robustness. The coefficient of the ERP appears larger in real transactions, although 
part of this difference is caused the high correlation between ERP and price (0.90, p < 0.01). 
As expected, the bid has a negative impact on stated choice, while the ERP is positive and 
significant. Figure 4 shows graphically the relation between price and ERP and utility using 
estimates from the second round of models A-B: the coefficient of the bid in model A sits between 
the coefficients of bid and ERP in model B, an indication that price sensitivity mildly declines when 
the ERP is present. In absolute value, the ERP has a lower impact on choice than the bid, with a 
ratio of 0.41-0.63 (1 for revealed preferences). This value corresponds to a consumer’s willingness 
to pay for a unit of ERP, i.e. 
ERP
Bid
BidU
ERPU





: consumers value a unit increase in ERP around 
£0.41-0.63, an indication of its value as an instrument to reduce the cognitive task.  
A series of Wald tests observe the relation between bid and ERP (table 6). First, coefficients 
of both bid and ERP do not change significantly across bidding rounds. Also, the estimated impact 
of bids does not vary across models ( 33   ), implying that the total impact of price plus ERP on 
choice is larger than that of price alone ( 343   ). Finally, the ERP is as important as the bid 
in the first round of bidding, but becomes significantly less important than the bid in the second 
round ( 043  ). These results indicate that ERPs adds significant information to consumers, 
but without reducing the importance of price. Consequently, the ERP does not seem to remove the 
informational content of price, but rather integrates it. The low number of observations could be 
responsible for these conservative results. 
Observing all other variables, the likelihood to purchase depends only on alcohol content, 
colour, and missing vintage year. The presence of the ERP might cause an informational bias 
(Smith et al., 2006): consumers stop using information on alcohol content and missing year in the 
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second CV, limiting their attention to the colour of the wine. Changes in the coefficient of specific 
attributes are consistent with the interference of ERPs on hedonic taste perception (Plassmann et al., 
2008), but could be partly due to collinearity between ERP and product characteristics. Coefficients 
of product attributes differ substantially in size and sign between revealed and stated preference, 
with alcohol being the only coefficient comparable in magnitude and sign across preference type. 
The different structure imposed by each model plays a major role in the different results. Apart 
from age and income, demographics contribute modestly to the model, while a significant ρ 
indicates unobservable tastes contained in the residuals have an important role.  
To add consistency with existing research on reference pricing (Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995; 
Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003; Kumar et al., 1998; Mayhew and Winer, 1992; Mazumdar et 
al., 2005), the same model is estimated as asymmetric reference price model (Mazumdar and 
Papatla, 2000; Rajendran and Tellis, 1994; Mazumdar et al., 2005) to allow for a different response 
to ERP depending on whether it is larger or smaller than price. This model incorporates an Internal 
Reference Value (IRV) equal to the fitted utility from the first CV survey (models A, C, E). In fact, 
respondents could determine whether to make a purchase on the basis of their own inference (Lowe 
and Alpert, 2010), and the IRV could be the real driver of the previous results. To this end, the 
estimated equation is  
ijiijiijijioij uBidERPLBidERPHIRVPU  )()( 4321   (8) 
where H and L are functions equal to one only if the ERP is higher (H) or lower (L) than price.  
Results (table 7) confirm that ERPs influence choice probability primarily when larger than 
price, while IRVs tend to have a negative impact on choice when the ERP is known (the coefficient 
is not significant in the first round). As expected, the bid retains a significantly negative coefficient, 
and results appear robust to variable specification. The negative influence of IRV when ERPs are 
available is consistent with Plassmann et al. (2008): consumers give high scores to a low-price wine 
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when price is unknown, and to a high-price wine when price is known, expecting a hedonic 
performance increasing with price.  
4.2. Does the ERP complement or substitute quality information provided by price? 
Results from table 5 indicate that consumers use both price and ERP in their choices. This 
section explores whether price retains its role as quality proxy once the ERP is available. The same 
question can be asked as whether price and ERPs complement or substitute each other in the 
provision of information on product quality. A Wald test presented in table 6 failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that the informational component of price remains the same when the ERP is known, so 
that )()( PICIC   . This point is supported by a similar coefficient of price in the presence 
or absence of ERPs (table 5). Wald tests also determine that the ERP adds explanatory power to the 
model, )()()( IC
ERP
I
P
IC   , and the overall impact of bid and ERP is negative, 
0)()(  ERPI
P
IC  . These results imply that ERPs contribute with new information, i.e. 
0)( ERPI , but consumers keep using price to infer information on quality. In other words, price 
does not seem to lose its role as quality proxy, and the ERP complements it. A formal identification 
of each δ requires an experimental setting and cannot be done using the present dataset.  
4.3. What is the impact of the rate of discount on utility? 
Besides communicating information, the ERP informs on the discount rate π, which can 
impact price sensitivity. As mentioned above, market price is a fraction of the original price: 
iii ERPBid  )1(  , where 10  i . Using the coefficients of the second bidding round of 
model B (table 5, similar results are obtained from all other models), utility can be written as 
])1[(2883.01679.02883.01679.0 iiiiii ERPERPBidERPU     
which reduces to  
iii ERPU  )]2883.0(1204.0[         (9) 
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Equation (9) indicates that purchase probability is negatively related to price (-0.1204) in the 
absence of a discount (πi = 0). This probability starts rising as discounts grow, reaching positive 
values for discounts larger than 41.76% (figure 5). The positive contribution of discounts is caused 
by a decline in sensitivity to the cost component of price (as in equation (4)): money spent becomes 
relatively less important when the ERP is available. This result also suggests that consumers might 
increase their attention to the potential money saved of price as discounts grow. 
More generally, figure 5 shows that for sufficiently high discounts the probability of a 
purchase increases with the original price, particularly for expensive options with a large discount 
because 0),( iiERPU  , ceteris paribus. This result suggest that in an extreme scenario consumers 
could purchase an item generating negative utility in all other attributes, 0),( ji DXU , as long as 
total utility is positive, i.e. 0),(),(  jiii DXUERPU  . This finding indicates that ERPs could 
lead to suboptimal choices that consumers might fail to realise, i.e. the consumer might purchase 
something she dislikes just because it is discounted. This cognitive shortcut could conflict with 
policy instruments (alcohol taxes, see Panzone, 2012), or stimulate the purchase of unnecessary 
goods and increase waste. Indeed, high quality products tend to have high ERP (Bagwell and 
Riordan, 1991) so that 0),( ji DXU  whenever 0),( iiERPU  , but future research should assess 
under which condition this relationship holds. 
4.4. Did consumers revise their choice when the ERP was available? 
The final step of this analysis explores how consumers used the information contained in the 
ERP. In particular, the data indicates that ERPs play a positive role in the probability of a purchase 
through several different channels. Firstly, ERPs could reduce uncertainty: in the second bidding 
round, 18 respondents (out of 194) reported to be “Unsure” when the ERP was unavailable (15 in 
the first bidding round), and only 9 when the ERP was supplied (both bidding rounds), with only 3 
people reporting uncertainty in both surveys (2 in the first round). Similarly, consumers might use 
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ERPs as anchor for their choices: decisions on whether to purchase an item or not might depend on 
the relative position of price. In fact, ERPs sets a reference point and prices lower than the ERP 
might seem reasonable even if the price is still higher than what the wine is really worth. 
Importantly, part of this decline in uncertainty might have been caused by a repeated-choice task, 
where consumers gained knowledge (e.g. Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999) or by a testing effect (e.g., 
Porath et al., 2010), rather than the presence of an ERP6. 
Consequently, it appears possible that ERPs constitute a possible source of adaptive bias: 
ERPs may be used to make time-efficient choices, reducing the costs of cognitive errors rather than 
their number (Haselton and Buss, 2003; Kool et al., 2010). The correct determination of an adaptive 
bias hinges on the knowledge of the real utility the consumer obtains from a good, but it is 
impossible to establish which CV collected the “real” expected utility. On average, the stated utility 
in the two initial bidding rounds (which are strictly comparable) with and without knowledge of the 
ERP do not differ, going from 1.89 (without ERP) to 1.91 (with ERP) (p = 0.90), and are strongly 
correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.75, p < 0.01). Nevertheless, 69 out of 194 respondents (36%) 
revised their initial intention to purchase when the ERP was supplied, with 38 (55%) moving 
upwards and 31 (45%) downwards (figure 7).  
The odds of the probability of revising up or down were estimated for those 69 respondents 
who revised their choices using the following logistic regressions: 
ijj
U
j
U
ij
U
i
UU
ij eLHPRKNCU  43210      (10a) 
ijj
D
j
D
ij
D
i
DD
ij uLHPRKNCD  43210      (10b) 
where CU and CD indicate a change up or down the utility scale, KN is self-reported knowledge, 
PR is the purchase rate, while H and L indicate whether the ERP is higher or lower than the bid, 
respectively. Odd ratios (table 8) indicate that the probability of a purchase increases significantly if 
ERP is larger than price, while the probability of rejecting the purchase increases significantly if the 
                                                 
6 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.  
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ERP is lower than price, in both cases of more than 600%. Very infrequent is an increase in the 
likelihood of a purchase when ERP < bid or viceversa. Consequently, the presence of ERPs 
contributes to consumer choices by providing a reference against which price is evaluated.  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of this work is to understand the impact of ERPs on consumer behaviour. In 
particular, the article explores whether and to what extent the presence of ERPs influences 
consumer choices. Compared to previous research (Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995; Kopalle and 
Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003; Kumar et al., 1998; Mayhew and Winer, 1992), the aim is to understand 
the informational and priming role of ERPs, and in this respect the paper is novel. This article uses a 
stated preference approach (opposite to the general use of revealed preferences) to remove the 
correlation between ERP and prices. Through a CV survey, consumers reported their intention to 
purchase the same wine at a random bid twice, once ignoring and once knowing the full price of the 
wine some time before the survey (a “Was-now” advertised ERP). The survey explored preferences 
for wine in the Greater Reading area (UK), using a representative sample of wines sold in 
supermarkets of the same study area. The small sample size and the narrow range of consumers in 
the survey from a geographical point of view substantially limit the generalisability of the findings 
of this article, but identify significant patterns of behaviour in a homogeneous market.  
The overall picture drawn by the results section is an “ERP dominance”: the presence of both 
ERP and price directs choices towards discounted expensive products. In fact, consumers: a) rely 
importantly on price and ERP in their choices; and b) anchor their expectations to the ERP by 
evaluating price relative to this information. As a result, ERPs lead consumers to buy primarily on 
full and discounted prices, paying less attention to other observable quality signals. In the extreme 
case where the utility for price and discounts is sufficiently high, consumers could even choose 
products with low or negative utility from other characteristics. This behaviour is indicative of 
adaptive reasoning: consumers aim at reducing the cognitive costs of errors rather than their number 
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when faced with risky decisions (Kool et al., 2010; Hilbert, 2012). Consumers can then reduce 
search costs for information by relying on high ERPs, willingly accepting the probability of mistake 
(Haselton and Buss, 2003; Kool et al., 2010). These results are relevant also in the use of price 
instruments in public policy, as taxation interacts with ERPs (see Panzone, 2012).  
Four sets of results provide a picture that contributes to the understanding of how consumers 
use ERPs in their choices. Firstly, ERPs positively influence the probability of a purchase. 
Consumers are nudged into preferring high ERPs because they generate expectations on the 
unobservable quality that is imperfectly available when price is alone. Importantly, the ERP anchors 
consumer preferences, leading consumers to evaluate the price to pay with respect to the full price 
of the same good. The impact of price remains the same when the ERP is present, but ERPs provide 
an incentive towards a purchase by reducing the weight given to price as a cost. Additionally, 
consumers seem to rely less on observable characteristics and unobservable preferences when ERPs 
are provided.  
Second, ERPs nudge consumers towards the purchase of goods with high full price and low 
discounted price, possibly leading to optimistic expectations over unobservable quality. In fact, 
ERPs provide useful information regarding the quality of the marketed good that complements the 
internal valuation of consumers. This finding is consistent with existing reference price theory 
according to which acceptance of external price information is mediated by internal quality 
valuation (e.g. Mazumdar et al., 2005). The ERP also has an important role on the decision-making 
process because it induces consumers to revise their choice, particularly when the ERP is greater 
than price. This “ERP dominance” is very likely a strategy that aims at reducing the cognitive costs 
of choices in markets with high information loads, where ERP is used as a quality cue. The 
empirical fieldwork analysed the wine market (a relative luxury) in the mass retail sector (a 
commodity market), which is characterised by a large heterogeneity of supply. Results might be 
stronger in markets where prices have a strong informational component, such as luxury goods.  
20 
 
Third, ERPs seem to complement rather than reduce the informational content of prices. This 
external stimulus has no significant impact on the coefficient of the bid: its value is not significantly 
different in the absence or presence of external price information. The surprising result is that in 
absence of ERPs consumers appear optimistic in their price-quality inference, where the quality 
component of price seems not to vary too much once the ERP is known. This result is consistent 
with theories of compensatory reasoning (Chernev and Hamilton, 2008): the existence of a good 
with undesirable features (such as price) can be justified only on the grounds of desirable 
unobservable quality. Consequently, consumers might use ERPs to confirm the earlier quality 
inference. At the same time, adaptation theory (Lee et al., 2008) indicates consumers may adapt by 
accepting the quality of existing options, viewing available options optimistically.  
Finally, the ERP operates through a reduction in the relevance of price as a cost. As discounts 
increase, the relative importance of price as quality proxy increases, and the utility of price can 
become positive for high discounts. Hence, consumers can be nudged into a purchase by providing 
both full and discounted price. In an extreme case, consumers could purchase a good expecting 
negative utility from observable product characteristic and positive utility from price and discount. 
It is unclear whether consumers consciously prefer products that happen to be on discount and 
patiently wait for a lower price to purchase them; or subconsciously direct their attention to price 
rather than product characteristics in the presence of a discount. Answers to debriefing questions 
suggest consumers are often aware that knowledge of the ERP changed their answer. However, it is 
unclear whether all consumers are aware of this mechanism (Plassman et al., 2008, suggests 
otherwise) and if they estimate correctly the magnitude of the impact.  
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning the caveats of the present work. The first important 
limitation is presenting two surveys consecutively within the same questionnaire. Apart from 
learning (e.g. Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999) and testing effects (e.g., Porath et al., 2010), respondents 
could have seen the ERP before answering the first task, leading to similar coefficients for the bid. 
Different estimates for other attributes suggest this problem was not fundamental. Equally, two 
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surveys within the same questionnaire might induce consumers to reflect on their willingness to be 
consistent in their response, despite the questionnaire indicating that the second task was intended 
as a completely new purchase (as in Bateman et al., 2008). A consistency bias should underestimate 
the number of consumers revising choices, therefore providing a possible downward bias that 
reinforces the findings of this article. At the same time, the different coefficients for attributes in the 
two exercises suggest that consistency did not undermine the implications of this article.  
A second caveat is methodological. The survey manipulated the presence of ERP in a within-
subject setting by always providing a choice task without an ERP first and then a choice task with 
an ERP (no filler task between them). Accordingly, part of the results might be a consequence of an 
ordering bias (Halvorsen, 1996) that would give an upward bias to the effects of the ERP. However, 
ordering bias tends to underestimate coefficients in the second task, partially compensating the bias 
from the design, and overestimate coefficients in the first task, possibly providing optimistic 
estimates when ERPs were not available. Furthermore, consumers react differently to different type 
of promotions (DelVecchio, 2005): this analysis only focuses on absolute monetary savings, and 
results might not be transferable to non-price promotions or different framing (e.g. percentages).  
To conclude, results in this article provide useful insights on the ability of the ERP to 
facilitate choices. Further research should explore the generalisability of these results, as well as 
giving a better insight on the implications of the reliance on the ERP as a proxy of quality can have 
on consumers' choices, welfare, and information externalities. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1:  Example of labels in the survey 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of the distribution of price variables in the sample 
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Figure 3: Trend in market price and ERP in Tesco stores by size in the study area, June 2008-May 
2009 
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Source: courtesy of Dunnhumby Ltd 
 
Figure 4: Graphical representation of the impact of price and ERP on utility 
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Figure 5: Graphical representation of the impact of full price of the wine on utility at changing 
levels of discounts 
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Figure 6: Scatter diagram relating the answers to the two CV surveys (2nd bidding round).  
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Note: The dashed triangle includes respondents reporting a higher utility in their second choice compared to their first 
choice. The dotted triangle includes respondents doing the opposite. 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Market share (volume) of wine sales in supermarkets in the sample and in the UK 
 This sample UK (2009) 
Tesco 28.80% 26.80% 
Sainsbury's 21.90% 14.90% 
Asda 18% 9.60% 
Morrisons 4.30% 9.10% 
Waitrose 13.30% 3.80% 
Somerfield 1.90% 2.00% 
Cooperative Group 4.60% 5.30% 
Other grocery and convenience stores 1.2% (Aldi only) 6.70% 
Total Grocery and Convenience stores 94% 78.00% 
First Quench - 4.60% 
Majestic Wine Warehouse - 2.70% 
Oddbins 6% 1.00% 
Other specialists - 3.70% 
Total specialists 6% 12.10% 
Direct wines (Laithwaites) - 5.20% 
Other (including other mail order) - 4.70% 
Source: UK values are from Mintel, cited in Bainbridge (2009), based on annual reports and accounts 
 
Table 2: Value of the bids for the different version of the CV experiment 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of prices of the wines in the sample 
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
Lower bid 2.69 3.09 3.59 3.99 
Starting bid 3.99 4.59 5.39 5.99 
Higher bid 6.09 6.99 8.09 8.99 
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 Last bid proposed Original price Price usually paid Market price 
Mean £5.44 £6.79 £5.41 £5.17 
Median £6.09 £5.99 £5.00 £4.39 
Range £2.69-£8.99 £2.49-£46.49 £3.00-15 £2.37-£37.19 
   
Table 4: Variables included in the estimation of the utility function.  
Variable Description Min Max Mean 
ERP External reference price of the wine. £2.49 £46.49 £6.79 
Bid Value of the second bid offered to the respondent (the price to be paid).  
Round 1 – No ERP 
Round 2 – No ERP 
Round 1 – With ERP 
Round 2 – With ERP 
 
3.59 
2.69 
3.59 
2.69 
 
5.99 
8.99 
5.99 
8.99 
 
4.97 
5.50 
4.99 
5.44 
Alcohol Alcohol content of the wine. 9 14.9 12.81 
White Dummy equal to one if the wine is white (baseline: rosé). 0 1 0.37 
Red Dummy equal to one if the wine is red (baseline: rosé). 0 1 0.55 
Private label Dummy equal to one if the wine is branded using the retailer’s name. 0 1 0.14 
Age of wine Age of the wine (years). 1 8 2.44 
No year Dummy equal to one if the wine does not report the vintage year. 0 1 0.18 
AOC Dummy equal to one if the wine has an AOC (or equivalent) denomination. 0 1 0.25 
Age  Age of the person answering the survey 3.06 4.17 3.82 
Income Yearly household income. 2.01 4.09 3.60 
No income  Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent did not report income. 0 1 0.08 
Hh drinkers Number of wine drinkers in the household. 1 7 2.03 
Knowledge  Self-reported knowledge, chosen amongst the following options: 
“No knowledge at all” 
“Low knowledge” 
“Fairly good knowledge” 
“Very good knowledge” 
 “Wine expert” 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0.13 
0.58 
0.23 
0.06 
0.00 
 
35 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimation of a utility function for wine7 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
 
F 
  
 
SP - Demographics only SP - Demographics + product characteristics SP - Demographics + product characteristics + Experience RP 
With ERP No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
  
Bidding round 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 Nested logit 
Bid -0.3643*** -0.2817*** -0.2534*** -0.2883*** -0.3652*** -0.2928*** -0.2632*** -0.2733*** -0.3922*** -0.2961*** -0.2721*** -0.2759*** -0.3352*** 
 S.E. (0.0754) (0.0282) (0.0961) (0.0431) (0.0828) (0.0325) (0.0988) (0.0459) (0.0832) (0.0316) (0.1029) (0.0471) (-0.0754) 
Original price 
  
0.1584*** 0.1679*** 
  
0.1166** 0.1735*** 
  
0.1108** 0.1696*** 0.3380*** 
 S.E. 
  
(0.0465) (0.0358) 
  
(0.0522) (0.0443) 
  
(0.0513) (0.0448) (-0.0770) 
Ln (income) -0.0258 -0.2547** -0.0386 -0.2176 -0.0181 -0.2865** -0.0158 -0.2705* 0.0421 -0.2310* 0.0312 -0.2329 
 
 S.E. (0.1224) (0.1291) (0.1432) (0.1450) (0.1296) (0.1354) (0.1460) (0.1479) (0.1289) (0.1341) (0.1481) (0.1510) 
 
No income -0.1761 0.1631 0.2056 0.3190 -0.1199 0.3020 0.1711 0.3829 -0.1058 0.3828 0.2362 0.4463 
 
 S.E. (0.2891) (0.2838) (0.2773) (0.2822) (0.2874) (0.2850) (0.2950) (0.2901) (0.2918) (0.2913) (0.2978) (0.2998) 
 
Hh drinkers 0.0477 0.1346 -0.0374 0.0876 0.0445 0.1587 -0.0318 0.1134 0.0984 0.1911* -0.0051 0.1376 
 
 S.E. (0.0951) (0.1081) (0.1232) (0.1047) (0.0928) (0.0997) (0.1204) (0.1064) (0.0925) (0.0995) (0.1226) (0.1052) 
 
Ln (age) -0.2540 -0.3545 -0.4955** -0.6089** -0.2969 -0.3750 -0.4841** -0.5823** -0.2215 -0.3450 -0.4681* -0.5819** 
 
 S.E. (0.2219) (0.2269) (0.2394) (0.2381) (0.2260) (0.2337) (0.2444) (0.2506) (0.2263) (0.2376) (0.2522) (0.2506) 
 
Alcohol 
    
0.0876 0.1989** 0.0293 0.1117 0.1295 0.2198** 0.0462 0.1218 0.2836*** 
 S.E. 
    
(0.0955) (0.0981) (0.1157) (0.0960) (0.0963) (0.0988) (0.1151) (0.0985) (0.0840) 
White 
    
-0.4650* -0.4778* 0.0529 -0.5917** -0.4878* -0.4777* 0.0480 -0.5935** 0.5313*** 
 S.E. 
    
(0.2688) (0.2710) (0.3119) (0.2730) (0.2760) (0.2675) (0.3169) (0.2694) (0.0759) 
Red 
    
-0.3265 -0.5079 0.0685 -0.5565* -0.3713 -0.5014 0.0614 -0.5535* 0.5434*** 
 S.E. 
    
(0.3104) (0.3159) (0.3618) (0.3151) (0.3180) (0.3163) (0.3706) (0.3158) (0.0901) 
AOC 
    
-0.2482 -0.0517 -0.0454 -0.2273 -0.2010 -0.0524 -0.0371 -0.2275 0.1412 
 S.E. 
    
(0.2101) (0.2036) (0.1999) (0.2030) (0.2128) (0.2069) (0.2030) (0.2064) (0.2118) 
Private label 
    
-0.2870 -0.1173 -0.0785 -0.1242 -0.2784 -0.1265 -0.0854 -0.1347 1.6241*** 
                                                 
7 The value of the nested logit for the white/red coefficient is the heterogeneity coefficient of the branch (hence strictly positive), and its value cannot be compared to the 
coefficient of white wines in the ordered probit. 
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 S.E. 
    
(0.2613) (0.2557) (0.2877) (0.3147) (0.2664) (0.2560) (0.2880) (0.3118) (0.3577) 
Age of wine 
    
0.0866 0.0502 0.0300 -0.0317 0.0785 0.0487 0.0373 -0.0235 -0.0088 
 S.E. 
    
(0.0776) (0.0788) (0.0629) (0.0711) (0.0815) (0.0831) (0.0651) (0.0771) (0.0746) 
No year 
    
-0.5574*** -0.5126** -0.5140** 0.0024 -0.5551** -0.5126** -0.5378** -0.0148 1.2417*** 
 S.E. 
    
(0.2113) (0.2053) (0.2494) (0.2720) (0.2196) (0.2102) (0.2476) (0.2755) (0.3763) 
Experience 2 
        
-0.3282 -0.3276 -0.1406 -0.1244 
 
 S.E. 
        
(0.2446) (0.2404) (0.2915) (0.2915) 
 
Experience 3 
        
-0.3976 -0.5215* -0.3725 -0.3565 
 
 S.E. 
        
(0.2787) (0.2892) (0.3219) (0.3264) 
 
Experience 4 
        
-0.9140* -0.4413 -0.2751 -0.1769 
 
 S.E. 
        
(0.4772) (0.3938) (0.4980) (0.4586) 
 
ρ 1.1895*** 
 
0.7645*** 
 
1.1373*** 
 
0.7256*** 
 
1.1608*** 
 
0.7204*** 
  
 
(0.1637) 
 
(0.1614) 
 
(0.1748) 
 
(0.1690) 
 
(0.1760) 
 
(0.1740) 
  
μ1 -3.3235*** -3.7013*** -2.7783** -3.5603*** -2.7139* -1.8083 -2.5808 -2.7211* -2.0663 -1.5088 -2.3294 -2.5854* 
 
 S.E. (1.0919) (1.0846) (1.2189) (1.1223) (1.4794) (1.4091) (1.6600) (1.4505) (1.4834) (1.4495) (1.7214) (1.4992) 
 
μ2 -2.8231*** -3.2309*** -2.3878* -3.1099*** -2.1858 -1.3125 -2.1824 -2.2499 -1.5341 -1.0066 -1.9281 -2.1122  
 S.E. (1.0902) (1.0717) (1.2235) (1.1199) (1.4790) (1.4074) (1.6680) (1.4473) (1.4859) (1.4465) (1.7315) (1.4969) 
 
μ3 -2.6944** -3.0571*** -2.2597* -3.0042*** -2.0473 -1.1279 -2.0511 -2.1392 -1.3960 -0.8194 -1.7962 -2.0009  
 S.E. (1.0918) (1.0705) (1.2241) (1.1193) (1.4792) (1.4072) (1.6698) (1.4461) (1.4863) (1.4453) (1.7335) (1.4953) 
 
μ4 -1.8878* -2.3758** -1.4425 -2.3809** -1.1884 -0.4049 -1.2160 -1.4780 -0.5406 -0.0977 -0.9568 -1.3355  
 S.E. (1.0914) (1.0703) (1.2290) (1.1178) (1.4815) (1.4187) (1.6786) (1.4552) (1.4868) (1.4554) (1.7420) (1.5080) 
 
Log likelihood -532.6229 
 
-514.4241 
 
-520.3779 
 
-506.4257 
 
-516.0834 
 
-505.2144 
 
-779.0324 
Chi2 25.7376*** 
 
23.6095*** 
 
51.5653*** 
 
37.7547*** 
 
58.2829*** 
 
40.8127*** 
 
43.51*** 
Respondents 194 
 
194 
 
194 
 
194 
 
194 
 
194 
 
260 
Note: Significance levels are as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Knowledge: the baseline is “No knowledge at all”; no respondent indicated to be a “Wine expert”. SP = 
Stated Preferences; RP = Revealed Preferences.  
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Table 6: Wald tests of equality of coefficients 
 H0 A B C D E F 
Bid (round 1) = Bid (round 2) α3, β 3=k 1.56 0.17 1.01 0.01 1.74 0.00 
ERP (round 1) = ERP (round 2) α4=k  0.06  1.60  1.80 
Bid + ERP (round 1) = 0 α3+α4=0  0.77  1.68  1.95 
Bid + ERP (round 2) = 0   7.95***  3.13*  3.39* 
Bid+ERP B/D/F (round 1) = 
 Bid A/C/E (round 1) 
α3+α4=β3  6.21**  3.73*  3.99** 
Bid+ERP B/D/F (round 2) = 
 Bid A/C/E (round 2) 
  14.27***  11.70***  10.81*** 
Bid B/D/F (round 1) = Bid A/C/E (round 1) α3=β3  1.33  1.06  1.36 
Bid B/D/F (round 2) = Bid A/C/E (round 2)   0.02  0.18  0.18 
Note: Significance levels are specified as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. All tests have one degree of freedom.  
Table 7: Relative importance of the ERP and IRP in the choice of wine 
 A-B  C-D  E-F  
 Demographics only Demographics  
+ product characteristics 
Demographics  
+ product characteristics 
+ Experience 
Bidding round 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Bid  -0.2505 -0.2944*** -0.0702 -0.1799*** -0.1034 -0.1912*** 
      S.E. (0.3530) (0.0472) (0.1593) (0.0666) (0.1308) (0.0616) 
IRV 0.0595 -0.5393*** 0.5605 -0.2915** 0.4831* -0.2693** 
      S.E. (0.9490) (0.1541) (0.3544) (0.1391) (0.2652) (0.1361) 
ERP (>Bid) 0.0295 0.1016*** 0.0289 0.1263*** 0.0297 0.1274*** 
      S.E. (0.0257) (0.0360) (0.0248) (0.0396) (0.0252) (0.0382) 
ERP (<Bid) -0.1137* 0.0235 -0.1136 0.0688 -0.1034 0.0595 
      S.E. (0.0598) (0.0785) (0.0730) (0.0864) (0.0725) (0.0857) 
Average price paid 0.0719 0.0194 0.0667 0.0107 0.0787 0.0097 
      S.E. (0.0657) (0.0817) (0.0647) (0.0852) (0.0651) (0.0854) 
ρ 0.7228*** -0.2944*** 0.5821*** -0.1799*** 0.6318*** -0.1912*** 
      S.E. (0.1568) (0.0472) (0.2182) (0.0666) (0.2134) (0.0616) 
μ1 -1.2628** -0.7337 -0.7891 -1.1175** -0.7549 -1.1579** 
      S.E. (0.5955) (0.4524) (0.6890) (0.5069) (0.6641) (0.5086) 
μ2 -0.9002 -0.2761 -0.4133 -0.6534 -0.3806 -0.7004 
      S.E. (0.5926) (0.4523) (0.6885) (0.5095) (0.6626) (0.5090) 
μ3 -0.7805 -0.1700 -0.2882 -0.5470 -0.2569 -0.5959 
      S.E. (0.5921) (0.4536) (0.6906) (0.5104) (0.6635) (0.5089) 
μ4 -0.0211 0.4759 0.5097 0.1023 0.5345 0.0386 
      S.E. (0.5985) (0.4543) (0.7170) (0.5147) (0.6853) (0.5119) 
Log-likelihood -526.4878  -527.3043  -527.1727  
Chi2 15.2871***  15.8535***  16.8322***  
N = 194. Note: Significance levels are specified as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
Table 8: Conditional log-odds ratios of revising utility and the relative position of the ERP 
 ERP>Bid ERP<Bid 
Revised up 6.4444*** 0.1648*** 
Revised down 0.1552*** 6.0677*** 
Adjusted by self-reported knowledge and purchase rate. Observations = 69 (respondents who changed in the first choice 
across survey). 
